Abstract. Attacks on host computers by malicious peripherals are a growing problem. Inexpensive and powerful peripherals, which attach to plug-and-play buses, have made such attacks easy to mount. Making matters worse, commodity operating systems lack systematic defenses, and users are often not aware of the scope of the problem. We present Cinch, a pragmatic response to this threat. Cinch uses virtualization to place the hardware in a logically separate, untrusted machine, and includes an interposition layer between the untrusted machine and the protected one. This layer accepts or rejects interaction with devices and enforces security policies that are easily configured and extended by users. We show that Cinch integrates with existing OSes, enforces policies that thwart real world attacks, and has low overhead.
Introduction
Peripheral devices are now powerful, portable, and plentiful. For example, the ubiquitous inexpensive "conference USB sticks" that we have all received include not only the stored conference proceedings but also a complete computer. Given this trend, it is easy to create malicious peripheral devices [67, 92, 102] . And yet, it is difficult to defend against them: standard hardware and operating systems continue to be designed to trust peripherals that are physically connected to the machine.
Consider a user who is induced to insert a malicious USB stick into his or her laptop [95, 134] . There are now many examples of a malicious device exploiting vulnerabilities in the host's drivers or system software [84, 91, 93] to inject malware (most notably, the infamous Stuxnet attack [98] ).
Another alarming possibility is that, while following the USB specifications, the malicious device can nevertheless masquerade as a keyboard. The device can then use its keystroke-producing ability to install a virus or exfiltrate files [16, 46, 124, 144] . As a last example, a USB device can eavesdrop on the communication between another device (say, the user's true keyboard) and the host. This requires compromising a hub (or deploying a malicious one), but such attacks exist [12, 17, 25, 81] .
These problems will get worse: on next-generation laptops [5, 10] , all ports, including the power port, are USB, which means that any of the attacks above could be carried out by a malicious charger. For that matter, you might be carrying around a compromised phone right now, if you borrowed a USB charger from the wrong person.
On the one hand, the concepts needed to solve these problems have long been understood. For example, in Rushby's separation kernel [128] , the operating system is architected to make different resources of the computer interact with each other as if they were members of a distributed system. More generally, the rich literature on high-assurance kernels offers isolation, confinement, access control, and many other relevant ideas. On the other hand, applying these works in full requires redesigning the operating system and possibly also the hardware.
Solutions that target device security for today's commodity systems are not adequate for the task, often because they were designed under different threat models ( §8). For example, work on device driver containment [86, 88, 97, 99, 100, 108, 114, 115, 126, [140] [141] [142] 146] and reliability [111, [129] [130] [131] trusts devices (or assumes they are at worst buggy); the attacks mentioned earlier are largely out of scope. Hotplug control frameworks [13, 15, 18, 22, 36, 38, 40, 54, 56 , 61] (a notable example is udev on Linux [62]) enable users to express that certain devices should be denied access. However, access is all-or-nothing, decisions are based upon the device's claimed identity (rather than its ongoing behavior), and a malicious device can disarm the enforcement mechanism. Qubes [49] provides strong isolation of applications, but its defenses against malicious hardware operate at coarse grain.
More generally, the I/O subsystems in commodity operating systems-as opposed to clean slate operating systems, like the separation kernel [127] and its modern descendants [87, 122] -do not have an organizing abstraction that could serve as a natural foundation for security features. This paper attempts to fill that void.
Our point of departure is a simple suggestion: rather than design a new framework, why not arrange for attached peripheral devices on commodity operating systems to appear to the kernel as if they were untrusted network endpoints? This would create an interposition point that would allow users and administrators to defend the rest of the computer, just as firewalls and other network middleboxes defend hosts from untrusted remote hosts. Our animating hope is that a system based on this picture would eliminate large classes of vulnerabilities, be easy to deploy, and enable new functionality. To explore that vision, this paper describes the design, implementation, and experimental evaluation of a system called Cinch. Cinch begins with the following requirements:
• Cinch should make peripheral buses look "remote", even though they are physically coupled to the rest of the computer.
• Under Cinch, traffic between the "remote" devices and the rest of the computer should travel through a narrow choke point. This choke point then becomes a convenient location for deploying defenses that inspect and moderate interactions with untrusted devices.
• Cinch should not require modifying bus standards, motherboards, OSes, or driver stacks. Any of these would be massive undertakings, would have to be done for multiple platforms, and would jettison the immense effort behind today's installed base.
• Cinch should be portable, in the sense that Cinch itself should not need to be re-designed or re-implemented for different operating systems.
• Cinch should be flexible and extensible: users, operators, and administrators should be able to quickly develop and deploy a wide range of defenses.
• Cinch should impose reasonable overhead in latency and throughput.
Cinch responds to these requirements with the following architecture, focused on USB as a target ( §4). Under Cinch, USB devices attach to a logically separate, untrusted machine; this is enforced via hardware support for virtualizing CPUs [77, 123] and I/O [79, 80] . The untrusted machine tunnels USB traffic to the protected machine over a software IP channel, potentially bypassing layers of software on the protected machine. Meanwhile, the tunnel serves as a choke point for enforcing policy.
To showcase the architecture, we build several example defenses ( §5). These include detecting attacks by matching against a database of attack signatures; sanitizing inputs by checking that messages comply with protocol and device specifications; device containment, i.e., sandboxing and hotplug policy enforcement; logging and remote auditing; and device authentication and traffic encryption.
Our implementation of Cinch works with Windows, Linux, and FreeBSD. Supporting other OSes requires only a small driver that encapsulates and decapsulates USB traffic, and injects this traffic into the underlying USB subsystem. Many such drivers already exist [66, 82, 109] .
To study Cinch's effectiveness, we developed exploits based on existing CVEs [14] (common vulnerabilities and exposures), performed fuzzing, and conducted an exercise with a red team, the members of which were kept separate from the development and operation of Cinch ( §7.1- §7.3). Our conclusion from these exercises is that Cinch can prevent many attacks, with relatively little operator intervention. We also find that developing new defenses on Cinch is convenient ( §7.4). Finally, Cinch's impact on performance is modest ( §7.5): Cinch can handle USB 3 transfers of up to 2.1 Gbps (a 38% reduction of the baseline of 3.4 Gbps), and delays interaction with devices by less than 3 milliseconds.
Cinch is enabled-and inspired-by much prior work in peripherals management, hardware-assisted virtualization, privilege separation, and network security. We delve into this work in Section 8. For now, we simply state that although Cinch's individual elements are mostly borrowed, it is a novel synthesis. That is, its contributions are not mechanical but architectural. These contributions are:
• Viewing peripherals as remote untrusted endpoints, and the architecture that results from this perspective.
• The instantiation of that architecture, which uses virtualization techniques to target a natural choke point in device driver stacks.
• A platform that allows defenses to existing attacks to be deployed naturally on commodity hardware, in contrast to the status quo.
• The implementation and evaluation of Cinch.
Cinch is not perfect ( §9). To begin with, it only shrinks, not eliminates, the attack surface exposed to devices. Notably, while Cinch can reduce the universe of possible inputs to the drivers and OS on the protected machine (by ruling out non-compliant traffic), a malicious device can still exploit bugs in how the code handles compliant traffic. On the other hand, the user can decide which devices get this opportunity. Furthermore, addressing buggy drivers and system software is a complementary effort ( §8). Similarly, Cinch does not unilaterally defend against higherlevel threats (data exfiltration, malware, etc.); however, Cinch creates a platform by which one can borrow and deploy known responses from network security ( §5). Finally, some of Cinch's defenses require changes within the device ecosystem. For example, defending against masquerading attacks requires device (but not bus) modifications. On the other hand, these changes are limited: in our implementation, one person prototyped them in less than two days ( §6). Perhaps most importantly, they can be applied to arbitrary unmodified legacy devices via an inexpensive adapter.
Nevertheless, looking at the misbehavior that it rules out and the functionality that it enables, Cinch is a substantial improvement over the status quo. Moreover, we hope that Cinch's perspective on device security will be useful in its own right.
Background: Universal Serial Bus (USB)
Commodity computing devices (phones, tablets, laptops, workstations, etc.) have several peripheral buses (in various combinations) for pluggable devices. These include USB [63, 64] focuses on USB as an initial target; we make this choice because USB is ubiquitous and complex, and because it has become a popular locus of hardware-based attacks. However, our approach applies to other buses. Figure 1 depicts the hardware and software architecture of USB. USB is a family of specifications for peripheral interconnect used for low-and medium-speed devices, and for power delivery. Bandwidth ranges from 1.5 Mb/s (USB 1.0) to 10.0 Gb/s (USB 3.1). Example devices include storage devices (e.g., memory sticks), keyboards, sound cards, video cameras, network adapters, and smart card readers. These devices connect to a host (for example, a laptop or desktop). Some computers can act as either a device or a host; for example, a smart phone or laptop can appear as a storage device or power consumer to a desktop, but as a host to a keyboard. USB hardware. USB has a tree topology. Each device has a point-to-point upstream connection to a hub. Hubs multiplex communication from one or more downstream devices, and are themselves devices with an upstream connection either to another hub or to the root of the tree. The root is a host controller, which is connected to the host by, for example, PCIe. The host controller always acts as the bus master: it initiates all transfers to and from devices, and devices are not permitted to transmit except when polled by the host controller.
USB protocol. The USB specifications [63, 64] define a protocol stack comprising three layers. The bottom layer includes electrical and logical specifications for pointto-point links (e.g., between devices and hubs), as well as a low-level packet protocol. The middle layer of the stack includes addressing, power management primitives, and high-level communication abstractions. USB devices, comprising one or more functions, sit at the top of the stack. Functions act as logically separate peripherals that are exposed by a single physical device. For example, a phone might expose a camera function, a network adapter function, and a storage function. Each of these functions is associated with its own high-level driver software; functions and drivers interact via the communication primitives exposed by the middle protocol layer.
USB driver architecture. The USB specification describes three layers of software abstraction on the host, mirroring the three protocol layers described immediately above. The software architecture described in the USB specification is present on all of the operating systems we investigated (Linux, Windows, several BSDs, OS X, etc.).
The lowest level, the host controller interface or HCI, configures and interacts with the host controller hardware via a local bus (e.g., PCIe). An HCI driver is particular to a host controller's hardware interface but exposes a hardware-independent abstraction to the next software layer, called core. Core manages device addressing and power management, and exposes an interface for highlevel drivers to communicate with devices. Core also enumerates devices when they are attached, which entails identifying the device and activating its driver.
The uppermost layer, class drivers, are high-level drivers that interact with functions (as described above). These drivers provide an interface between USB devices and the rest of the OS. For example, a keyboard's class driver interacts with the kernel's input subsystem. Another example is the mass storage class driver, which talks to the kernel's storage subsystem. The USB specification defines a set of generic classes for a broad range of devices, e.g., keyboards, mice, network interfaces, storage, cameras, audio, and more. Operating systems generally include support for a large subset of the generic classes, allowing compliant devices to leverage preexisting drivers.
Threats
In this section, we specify a general threat model and our assumptions about adversarial devices. Within this framework, we describe and classify USB-based attacks.
Why is USB so vulnerable?
The root of the security problems with USB is the implicit assumption that hardware is inherently trustworthy, or at worst buggy but non-malicious. As a consequence, neither USB nor mainstream OSes are designed to be robust in the face of malicious devices. One manifestation of this is the lack of authentication or confidentiality guarantees at any layer of the USB standard. Devices are trusted to self-report their identity and capabilities without authentication; the communication primitives at all layers of the USB protocol stack ( §2) are cleartext; and USB generic classes lack end-to-end authentication or encryption, making spoofing and snooping trivial [3, 25, 124] .
A related issue is that the design of both the USB protocol and common driver stacks emphasizes convenience above correctness and security. For example, hotplugged devices are often activated without user confirmation. Coupled with the lack of device authentication, this means that the OS cannot determine what device the user intended to connect, or even that a hotplug event was generated by the user (rather than a malicious device [24, 84] ). Moreover, malicious device makers can rely on the near universal availability of generic class drivers (e.g., for keyboards), since users expect these devices to "just work."
The range and sophistication of USB-based threats has escalated substantially in recent years. Whereas hardware design costs were once a barrier to entry, creating custom USB devices is now cheap, both in dollars and development time [9, 50, 58, 67, 102, 103] . Indeed, today's commodity USB devices are essentially software defined [46, 84, 102] , substantially lowering the bar.
The press plays a role too: demonstrating USB attacks has become fashionable (e.g., recent media hype [6-8, 42, 59, 118] surrounding USB devices with reprogrammable firmware [46, 89, 124] ). A third factor is ease of transmission: malicious USB devices can easily find their way into the hands of victims. This is partly due to vulnerabilities in the supply chain itself [41, 83, 104, 139] , e.g., adversarial manufacturers [105] . Intelligence agencies have also been known to use their resources to intercept and "enhance" shipments [27, 101] , including conference giveaways [20, 21] .
Threat model
We assume that devices can deviate from the USB specification arbitrarily. They may also violate the user's expectations, e.g., by masquerading as other devices or passively intercepting bus traffic. Alternatively, devices can present a higher-level threat, e.g., a storage device containing an invalid filesystem that triggers a bug in a filesystem driver. However, devices that cause physical damage to the host (e.g., with high voltage [125] ) are out of scope.
We assume that the host's OS and drivers can be buggy but not malicious. Likewise about the host's hardware besides the USB controller and USB devices.
A taxonomy of USB threats
We classify known and hypothesized attacks against USB into three broad categories. Note that we do not limit malicious devices to these attacks; rather, this taxonomy guides our decisions when implementing defenses ( §5).
Attacks on USB drivers. USB drivers present an attack surface to devices. We decompose driver attacks into two categories. First, a device can stay within the USB specification but exploit a driver's buggy implementation. Second, and perhaps more interestingly, a device can deviate from the USB specification. The space of possible misbehaviors here is vast. As several examples, devices might try to deliver more data to the driver than indicated by the device's configuration [32] ; claim impossible configurations [71] [72] [73] [74] ; exceed limits prescribed by USB class specifications [28, 45, 53] ; or produce otherwise invalid or nonsensical reports [4, 33, 84, 91-93, 96, 136] .
The second category is particularly problematic, as it sets up a difficult software engineering situation. Since a driver writer needs to be prepared for an enormous range of undocumented behavior, drivers need lots of error checking code; such code is often ill-exercised and creates complexity, leading to more vulnerabilities. Indeed, more than half of the vulnerabilities related to USB drivers in the CVE database [14] are the result of improper handling of noncompliant USB transfers; many more such vulnerabilities likely remain undisclosed [91, 136] .
Other attacks on the host via USB. USB exposes the rest of the host system's kernel or user software to attacks by malicious devices. Recall that USB class drivers provide an interface between devices and other kernel subsystems ( §2). Leveraging this interface, a USB flash drive, while following the USB specification, might nevertheless be used to attack the kernel's storage or filesystem drivers [19, 48, 68, 69] . Alternatively, that same USB device might carry a virus [98] or covertly steal data [138] .
Privacy and authentication threats. Privacy and authentication threats can be further decomposed into two categories, device masquerading and bus snooping.
Device masquerading. When a device is plugged in, the host asks the device for information about its capabilities. The device can respond, disguised as another device or even another class [29, 44, 46, 70, 90, 120, 124, 144] . For example, Psychson [46] enables rewriting the firmware on a cheap USB storage device so that it will act like a keyboard; similarly, the commercially available "USB Rubber Ducky" [67] is a programmable keystroke injector designed to look like a flash drive. A malicious hub can likewise spoof other devices [25] . Penetration testers have used such tools to breach security systems [3, 24] .
Bus snooping. A malicious hub can record traffic from other devices to recover sensitive information [17, 81] . Furthermore, the hub itself need not be malicious; if its firmware is buggy, the bugs can be exploited by a malicious device that attacks the hub [25] . Hardware virtualization provided by the IOMMU separates the USB host controller from the blue machine, redirecting DMA and interrupts to the red machine. The red machine encapsulates and sends USB packets through the Tunnel to the Gateway. Once the Gateway has applied all security policies, packets are redirected to a driver on the blue machine that de-encapsulates the packets, and re-injects them into the blue machine's unmodified USB stack.
Architecture
The top-level goal of Cinch is to enable safe interactions between untrusted devices and a host machine. Thus, Cinch must answer the question, in the context of the USB bus, where and how can one create a logical separation between the bus and the host, while arranging for an explicit communication channel between them?
We begin with the "where." Cinch inserts a Gateway between the USB host controller hardware and the host controller interface driver (Fig. 1,  §2 ). With this narrow choke point, the Gateway can handle all USB traffic.
Next, we describe the "how." Cinch decomposes interaction with USB devices into two machines. One, the red machine, connects to the untrusted USB devices. The other, the blue machine, is the host that Cinch protects. (These names are inspired by Lampson's red/green machine partitioning [113] .) The Gateway is placed at the "entrance" to the blue machine.
The red machine captures traffic from USB devices and forwards it to the Gateway via an explicit channel, the Tunnel. The Gateway inspects all traffic through the Tunnel, makes policy decisions (for example, dropping or rewriting USB traffic, as described in Section 5), and finally forwards permitted traffic to the blue machine.
Cinch's instantiation of this architecture is depicted in Figure 2 . This design leverages hardware for virtualizing processors and I/O devices [79, 80] .
1 Specifically, the red machine is a virtual machine (VM), and the USB hardware is mapped directly-and exclusively-to this machine. This mapping is accomplished with an IOMMU and interrupt remapping. As a brief summary of these features, an IOMMU provides address translation and protection, which enables a physical device to perform DMA transfers to a designated VM and only that VM [85] ; interrupt remapping provides analogous translation and protection for interrupts. With these features, a virtual machine monitor (VMM) can give a VM direct control over hardware while isolating that hardware from the VMM and other VMs.
Discussion. Cinch's architecture meets most of the goals described in Section 1. It isolates USB devices in the red machine, and its Gateway is a narrow choke point. It also limits overheads to reasonable factors ( §7.5) by leveraging hardware-assisted virtualization. Finally, Cinch requires only relatively small kernel modifications on the red machine and the blue machine to capture USB traffic and pass it through the Tunnel; otherwise, Cinch reuses existing hardware and software. We discuss the remaining requirement, Cinch's flexibility, in Section 5.
On the other hand, instantiating Cinch efficiently requires I/O virtualization hardware; while widespread, such support is not yet universal.
Building defenses with Cinch
This section describes five classes of defenses (which we call Policies) that Cinch supports, and the threats ( §3) against which they defend. These Policies are not new; we discuss previous implementations in Section 8. Cinch's contribution is providing a platform that makes a range of Policies straightforward to develop and deploy.
Detecting attacks by signature
The first strategy is signature matching-i.e., dropping messages that match a known pattern. Defenses in this class protect against attacks on drivers and user software ( §3.3). The same strategy is used in network security (intrusion detection [52] ) and desktop security (antivirus [11] ), and has been effective in practice, as a firstline defense. The advantages and disadvantages hold in our context; we review them briefly.
To begin with, signature generation is flexible, and can be done by victimized companies, individual users, and designated experts, based on observations of past attacks and reverse engineering of malicious devices. Further, shared databases of observed attack signatures can immunize others. This strategy also enables rapid responses to emerging threats: a signature of an attack is typically available long before the vulnerability is patched.
The principal disadvantage, of course, is that signatures generally provide protection only against previously observed attacks. Furthermore, they suffer from both false positives and false negatives: signatures that are too general may disable benign devices, while signatures that are too specialized can fail to catch all variants of an attack.
Cinch's signature Policy. We implement a signature matching module in Cinch that compares all USB traffic from the red machine to a database of malicious payload signatures. When a match occurs, Cinch disallows further traffic between the offending device and the blue machine.
Sanitizing inputs
Another class of defensive strategies detects when devices deviate from their specification. Examples include checking that messages are properly formatted and that devices respond correctly to commands. These strategies are useful for defending against attacks on USB drivers ( §3.3).
A related strategy is recognizing and fixing device "quirks": known noncompliant behavior that is benign. 2 This is similar to traffic normalization [106] , by which firewalls convert traffic to a canonical representation, to aid analysis, and ensure that their decisions are consistent with end-host protocol implementations. In Cinch, fixing quirks before traffic reaches the blue machine also means that the latter exercises fewer code paths when handling quirky devices, potentially reducing its attack surface.
Cinch's compliance Policy. This Policy monitors device states and transitions, and enforces invariants on individual messages and entire transactions. We manually processed the USB 2 and 3 specifications [63, 64] , along with the specification of five device classes (mass storage, HID, printer, power, and debug device) [65] .
As a simple example, the compliance Policy checks that device-supplied identification strings are well formed (i.e., valid UTF-16 and of proper length), and rewrites noncompliant strings. More complicated state and transition checking is effected by keeping persistent information about each device for the duration of its connection.
Cinch's compliance Policy currently handles noncompliance conservatively: behavior that cannot be easily fixed (e.g., rewriting identification strings as described above) is considered a potential attack, and the offending device is disconnected. Cinch does not yet have rich support for fixing known device quirks; instead, users can disable strict compliance checking on a per-device basis.
Containing devices
This category includes querying a user for information about a newly connected device, restricting a device to a subset of its full functionality, and isolating devices in private protection domains. Importantly, decisions about what action to take must happen before the device is allowed to communicate with the blue machine. These defenses are useful against attacks on driver and user software, and can foil masquerading attacks ( §3.3).
Requesting user interaction and restricting devices to a subset of their functionality are forms of hotplug control. At a high level, a hotplug Policy decides, when a device is connected, whether it should be allowed to communicate with the blue machine; and if so, what functionality should be allowed. Recall from Section 2 that devices can define multiple functions, each of which is a logically separate peripheral. As an example, a phone might expose both network adapter and storage functions. A careful user wishing to tether her laptop to a friend's phone could be informed of available functionality upon device connection, and choose to disallow the storage function as a precaution against viruses.
Alternatively, the user might choose to connect the phone's storage function to a separate protection domaina sandbox-with limited capabilities and a narrow interface to the blue machine. In the storage case (e.g., an unknown USB stick), the sandbox could scan files for viruses, and could expose a high-level interface (e.g., an HTTP server) to the blue machine. This leverages existing software designed for interacting with untrusted machines (in this case, a web browser), and can bypass many layers of software in the blue machine. A drawback of this approach is that it changes the interface to the device.
Cinch's containment Policy. Cinch's Gateway enforces hotplug policies, meaning that the blue machine never interacts with disallowed devices. We implement a "surgical" hotplug Policy: individual device functions can be allowed or disallowed. Cinch's Gateway can also sandbox whole devices or individual functions by redirecting selected USB traffic to private virtual machines.
Encryption and authentication
Defensive strategies that incorporate end-to-end encryption and authentication protect against devices that masquerade as other devices or snoop on bus traffic ( §3.3). For example, if valid devices are expected to communicate with authenticated and encrypted connections, then it makes sense to configure Cinch's hotplug Policy ( §5.3) to reject unauthenticated devices. This would keep a rogue device from masquerading as a different device, or a malicious hub from capturing USB traffic.
Implementing encryption and authentication requires, first, a compatible device. Potential concerns here are development overhead (to create a new device), computational overhead, and deployability/adoption. However, the first two concerns are mitigated by abundant support for rapid development of embedded cryptographic applications [37, 39, 75] , coupled with the speed of modern embedded processors. The adoptability concern can be mitigated by an adapter that provides encryption and authentication to legacy devices; we describe a proof-ofconcept shortly.
Second, authentication requires a trust relationship between the blue machine and the device. As one approach, trusted device manufacturers can ship devices with signed certificates. As an alternative, a user can "pair" a new device with his or her computer (similar to Bluetooth [76] ); this obviates trusting a manufacturer but adds a setup step.
Proof-of-concept USB security adapter. We designed an adapter that lets unmodified legacy devices communicate over TLS [94] .
At a high level, the security adapter acts as both a USB host (for an attached legacy device) and a USB device (attached to the user's machine); it tunnels the legacy device's transfers over a TLS session with the Gateway. Two issues arise in this arrangement. The first is that a TLS session requires a full duplex stream transport, but USB's communication primitives do not immediately yield this abstraction (since the USB host controller initiates all transfers; §2). The second is that the security adapter is a USB device, but the Gateway does not implement a USB driver stack and thus cannot directly communicate with the security adapter via USB.
To solve the first issue, we design the security adapter to emulate an Ethernet-over-USB device [65] ; the TLS session then uses TCP for transport. 3 We address the second issue by terminating the security adapter's USB transfers at the red machine. The red machine and the security adapter then establish a private IP network, and the red machine routes IP packets from the security adapter to the Gateway via the Tunnel. Note that this is unlike the red machine's handling of other devices, whose USB traffic the red machine captures and forwards to the Gateway.
The security adapter captures USB transfers from attached legacy devices and forwards them to the Gateway over the TLS session.
Cinch's crypto Policy. Cinch's Gateway implements a TLS endpoint to communicate with the security adapter. This endpoint implements mutual authentication: the security adapter must present a client certificate signed by an authority that the Gateway trusts, and the security adapter also checks the Gateway's certificate. This prevents manin-the-middle attacks, e.g., by malicious hubs.
Logging and auditing
Logging is part of many defensive strategies: auditing can reveal anomalous behavior that might represent a new attack. Moreover, logs can be used to develop new signature-based defenses ( §5.1).
Cinch's logging Policy. Cinch's Gateway can be configured to log some or all traffic to and from the blue machine. Cinch can also replay logged data; we used this functionality to help develop attack signatures for our security evaluation ( §7.3). Another feature of Cinch's logging implementation is that it can be configured to log to a remote server. This feature could allow realtime analysis of data from many different blue machines, e.g., in a corporate environment; implementation is future work.
Extensions
Cinch is flexible enough to enable usage scenarios beyond the ones described above. One example is data exfiltration prevention, which is often employed at the network level to address the threat of data theft [107, 116, 117, 132, 133] , and yet is generally considered a more difficult problem in the context of USB [138] . By combining realtime remote auditing ( §5.5) with signature detection ( §5.1), Cinch makes it natural for administrators to apply exfiltration prevention policies to USB devices.
Implementation
We explain how the red machine is instantiated, how USB devices communicate with the blue machine through a Tunnel, and how the Gateway interposes on this Tunnel ( §6.1). We also discuss the Policies implemented in Cinch, utilities that we use to create and test new exploits, and our method for deriving payload signatures ( §6.2). Finally, we describe a proof-of-concept security adapter that we use to transparently provide encryption and authentication for existing USB devices ( §6.3).
Blue machine and red machine
Cinch's red machine is a Linux virtual machine running on QEMU-KVM [47] . Since Cinch requires I/O and processor virtualization support, it works on architectures for which KVM fully supports both, namely, x86_64 processors with the appropriate extensions ( §4). 4 The red machine uses a virtual Ethernet device to instantiate the Tunnel between the red machine and the blue machine. There are two reasons for this. First Cinch's blue machine is another QEMU-KVM instance; the blue machine can run any operating system that works with QEMU (we tested Linux, FreeBSD, and Windows). This departure from the architecture depicted in Figure 2 ( Serial device without bulk endpoint crashes host red machine FIGURE 3-CVEs for known-signature exercise ( §7.1). The last column describes which Policy ( §5) or architectural component ( §4) of Cinch prevents the exploit. The red machine prevents exploits by refusing to connect an invalid device or by crashing.
virtual USB controller that connects usbredir devices to the guest, meaning that OSes run with no modification.
Gateway
The Gateway is implemented in Rust [51] ; it comprises about 8K SLoC. Its major components are parsers for usbredir and USB packets, and a library that provides abstractions for creating new Policies. This library is similar to, and inspired by, the Click modular router [112] ; a significant difference is that Cinch's module library provides domain-specific abstractions for USB. As in Click, modules are arranged in a chain such that the output of one module becomes the input to the next module in the chain. Several such chains can be configured to operate in parallel. Users configure module chains with JSON files.
Proof-of-concept USB security adapter
We implement the security adapter ( §5.4) using a BeagleBone Black [9] single-board computer that has a 1 GHz ARM Cortex-A8 processor and 512 MB RAM. Connections are mutually authenticated with client and server certificates. The security adapter and the Gateway check that each other's certificate is signed by a trusted certificate authority; in our prototype, we generate a CA certificate and install it on both the security adapter and the Gateway. The security adapter runs a version of usbredir that we augmented with support for TLS 1.2 [94] using OpenSSL [43] . The Gateway's crypto module uses stunnel [55] to listen for TLS connections.
Evaluation
Our evaluation of Cinch answers the following questions:
• How effectively does Cinch defend against attacks? We subject Cinch to existing CVEs ( §7.1), fuzzing ( §7.2), and a red team exercise ( §7.3).
• Can new functionality be developed and deployed on Cinch with ease? We answer this question qualitatively, by relating our experiences ( §7.4).
• What is Cinch's performance overhead? We examine latency and throughput ( §7.5). 
Known-signature attacks
We begin our evaluation of Cinch by subjecting it to synthetic attacks, based on documented vulnerabilities. For the attacks that succeed, we specify a "rematch" protocol, in which the operator can install a signature ( §5.1) and then retry. This exercise is intended to address a counterfactual hypothetical: if Cinch had been deployed at the time of these vulnerabilities, would it have protected against their exploitation? And, if not, would a subsequent defensive reaction have been effective?
Method and experiment. We filtered the CVE database [14] to select the 10 most recent vulnerabilities that: (1) target Linux or Windows, and (2) target one of HCI, USB Core, generic class drivers, or a non-generic driver that ships with mainline Linux. Figure 3 lists the vulnerabilities. For each vulnerability, we construct a payload that exploits it. While the versions of Windows and Linux that we run are largely free of these vulnerabilities, we consider an attack successful if the payload reaches the blue machine at all. On the offensive side, we mount the attacks using a Facedancer [102] -a custom USB microcontroller that can masquerade as any USB device and issue arbitrary payloads when connected to the target machine. We program and control the Facedancer through a Python interface, using the umap tool [92] .
On the defensive side, we configure Cinch with the signature ( §5.1), compliance ( §5.2), and logging ( §5.5) Policies. For each exploit, we start with an empty signature database and check whether the attack succeeds; if it does, we add a signature (based on the payload and associated metadata), and conduct a rematch. Results are summarized in Figure 4 ("existing CVEs"), and the prevention mechanism is listed in Figure 3 . Cinch successfully detects and drops 7 of the offending payloads, with no special-purpose configuration. One of the payloads caused Cinch's red machine to crash; we consider this defense to be successful (though arguably Pyrrhic) because the blue machine was protected. Two of the payloads were successful on their first try; however, they were blocked in the rematch phase. These payloads initially succeeded because they targeted device-specific functionality in non-generic drivers (as opposed to the generic class drivers described in Section 2); this functionality is not defined by the USB spec, and hence is not covered by Cinch's compliance Policy (which by default allows unknown traffic to and from non-generic drivers).
Fuzzing
Next, we assess the robustness of Cinch's compliance Policy ( §5.2), via fuzz testing. We limit this exercise to attacks that target device enumeration, as implemented in USB core ( §2). On the one hand, this is not a comprehensive exercise; future work is to broaden it. On the other hand, device enumeration is a common and well-studied source of vulnerabilities [136] , and accounts for about half of the USB-related issues in the CVE database. In enumerating devices, USB core handles each device's USB descriptors: a set of packets, generated by the device, that identify its manufacturer, function, USB version, capabilities, etc. The process is complicated by wide diversity in descriptors, subtle interactions among the functions that the descriptors specify, hierarchy in those functions, etc. Furthermore, the vulnerable surface includes drivers' initialization functions, since USB core passes descriptors to those functions. Indeed, Schumilo et al. [136] demonstrate that many OSes and drivers do not handle device enumeration properly, especially when the device information is inconsistent or maliciously crafted.
Method and experiment.
On the offensive side, we use a fuzzing tool (vUSBf [135] ) that emulates a USB device and generates the emulated device's descriptor randomly. We update vUSBf to work with the most recent version of usbredir (v0.7.1) and then replace Cinch's red machine with an instance of vUSBf. As a result, vUSBf plugs directly into Cinch's Gateway. We use vUSBf to emulate 10,000 randomized devices in succession.
On the defensive side, we run Cinch, configured with compliance ( §5.2) and logging ( §5.5) Policies. (Cinch also runs with its signature-checking Policy enabled, but the database of signatures is empty.) If Cinch allows the emulated device to communicate with the blue machine, we account this a failure.
We expect that the overwhelming majority of test cases will not obey the USB specification, and that Cinch's compliance Policy will detect and prevent these cases. As a baseline, we also present the same 10,000 inputs to a system that is not running Cinch.
Results are summarized in Figure 4 ("vUSBf"). Cinch's compliance module prevents all 10,000 randomized devices from connecting to the blue machine. The three most commonly detected violations are: (1) improperly formatted strings, (2) invalid device classes, and (3) invalid or inconsistent number of functions. On the one hand, these results could be argued to be inconclusive because none of these inputs exploited the baseline setup without Cinch. On the other hand, the authors of vUSBf identified 13 sample exploits (after millions of trials) that cause driver crashes on certain (older) systems, and Cinch blocks those 13 with no configuration.
Red team exercise
Our next set of exercises subjects Cinch to attack classes that were not known to us a priori. This is intended not only to asses Cinch's effectiveness but also to avoid some of the bias that arises when developers choose the attack experiments (as above).
Specifically, we set up a red team that was charged with developing new USB exploits to compromise blue machines (including crafting new vulnerabilities in the blue machine's OS, which was meant to emulate the ongoing process of discovering and patching bugs). In our case, the red team comprised a subset of the authors who were kept separate from the developers of Cinch, and worked independently. Interactions between the red team and the developers were tightly controlled, following an evaluation protocol that was documented in advance. Figure 5 summarizes the protocol. We present the results of the first two rounds; the third is ongoing work.
Summary of red team exploits. The red team developed 3 exploits for Windows and 16 exploits for Linux across both rounds of the protocol. Some of these exploits
Protocol
There are three rounds, each of which has a setup, match and rematch phase. Setup: Red team chooses an OS (which they can modify arbitrarily) and develops exploits that crash the OS. Match: Cinch developers configure Cinch to run the OS provided by the red team as the blue machine; both teams confirm that the exploits crash the OS when Cinch is not present. The Cinch developers deploy Cinch, and the red team mounts its exploits. The Cinch developers collect traces, and both teams document the outcome of the exercise. Rematch: Cinch developers get the traces, and are given the opportunity to analyze and react to them. Then the match phase is rerun.
Attacker knowledge
Round 1: The red team is given access to a technical report that documents an earlier version of Cinch. This models an attacker with limited knowledge of Cinch. Round 2: The red team is given access to a machine that is running Cinch. This models an attacker with black-box access to Cinch, or an attacker that possesses Cinch's binaries. Round 3: The red team is given access to Cinch's source code. This models an attacker with full knowledge of Cinch's logic (but not its configuration).
Developer ability
Cinch developers freeze Cinch's code prior to the match phase of round 1. After that, Cinch developers may apply configuration-only changes: new signatures, etc. shared the same attack vector but used different payloads.
The Windows exploits targeted a fresh copy of Windows 7; the red team did not install updates since the vulnerabilities that these exploits target have been patched. Since red team members did not have access or visibility into the Windows USB stack, these exploits were found primarily through fuzzing guided by past CVEs.
For Linux, the red team modified the kernel to introduce vulnerabilities both in the USB stack and in the rest of the system. Specifically, the red team modified a function within HCI that processes USB request blocks (the data structure representing a message in the USB subsystem) to trigger a kernel panic on certain device payloads; introduced a bug in USB core that causes the kernel to crash whenever a device with a certain configuration is connected; inserted a bug in Linux's HID input subsystem (drivers/input/input.c) that leads to a null pointer dereference when a particular sequence of input events is received; and introduced buggy drivers for a USB printer, a camera, and an audio device.
Finally, the red team observed that the VFAT filesystem driver in Linux 4.2 does not validate the number of file allocation tables (FATs) in the BIOS Parameter Block (BPB). While we were unable to exploit this bug directly, it can result in an invalid filesystem being mounted. To "enhance" this bug, the red team introduced a null pointer dereference in the BPB handling routine (fs/fat/inode.c), triggered by a filesystem with an invalid BPB.
Results are summarized in Figure 4 ("red team round 1", "red team round 2").
First round. The red team developed 7 exploits for this round (2 for Windows and 5 for Linux). In the match phase, Cinch prevented both Windows exploits and 3 out of the 5 Linux exploits. The Windows exploits were prevented by Cinch's architecture rather than by any of its Policies. Specifically, the red machine runs a Linux kernel; that kernel is not vulnerable to either of the Windows exploits and recognizes both connected devices as invalid. As a result, Cinch does not export these devices in the first place, protecting the Windows blue machine.
The two Linux exploits that Cinch was unable to prevent occurred at layers that were outside the semantic knowledge of Cinch (VFAT and the input subsystem). Using the traces-collected with Cinch's logging module ( §5.5)-the Cinch developers derived signatures. In the rematch phase, signatures prevented these exploits.
Second round. In the match phase, Cinch prevented 14 out of 19 attacks (these include attacks from the first round). The rematch phase again relied on signatures; of the remaining five exploits, signatures blocked two. The remaining three succeeded because they are polymorphic: the exploits altered their payload to evade detection.
These results, while preliminary, suggest that Cinch is able to prevent several exploits-primarily those that act as invalid USB devices-without prior configuration; several more can be prevented after deriving signatures. The remaining exploits might be prevented with more intrusive approaches (e.g., sandboxing; §5.3).
Tradeoff between security and availability. It is possible to develop more liberal signatures to prevent polymorphic attacks (e.g., using wildcards); however, this risks disabling benign devices. To ensure that our signatures were not too stringent, we established a representative set of benign devices: a USB flash drive, printer, cellphone, SSD, keyboard, and mouse. After each phase of the experiment, we checked that our signatures did not prevent the correct functioning of any of these devices.
We found one failure: the signatures for the VFAT exploit prevented the blue machine from communicating with any storage device with a VFAT filesystem. We removed the offending signature and accounted that test a failure (i.e., Cinch did not prevent the exploit), since such a signature would not be deployable for most users.
Cinch's flexibility and extensibility
There are two ways that Cinch can currently be extended: through new signatures and configurations to enhance existing Policies ( §5), and through new Policies that add new functionality. We discuss our experience in both cases.
Deriving new signatures. We take a straightforward approach to deriving signatures for a given attack: we first log malicious traces, and then replay them in a controlled debugging environment. This allows us to observe the configuration and details of the offending payload and its target in situ. We use this information to derive candidate signatures that are on the order of 10-15 lines of JSON; deriving a signature for the exploits in Section 7.3 took roughly 5 to 30 minutes, depending on: (1) the number of packets the exploit sent, and (2) the layer of the system targeted by the exploit: the more semantic knowledge Cinch has about that layer, the easier it is to derive a signature.
Creating new Policies. Adding a new Policy for Cinch requires implementing an instance of a Rust trait [2] (roughly analogous to a Java interface or a C++ abstract class; this trait is defined in the Gateway library, §6.2) that processes USB packets, and adding the new Policy to Cinch's configuration file. Based on this configuration, Cinch's module subsystem automatically dispatches USB packets to configured chains ( §6.2). To give an idea of Policies' complexity: Cinch's largest, compliance, is 2500 SLoC; the rest average just 180 SLoC.
What are the costs of Cinch?
To understand the performance cost associated with using Cinch, we investigate two microbenchmarks, one for latency and one for throughput. We use Debian Jessie (Linux 4.2.6) as the blue machine's OS for these tests. Is Cinch's added latency acceptable? To quantify the delay introduced by the components of Cinch, we connect the blue machine and another machine on a local network, using an Ethernet-to-USB adapter. We record the roundtrip time between the two machines (using ping) as we add components of Cinch. Figure 6 shows the results. For our baseline, we connect the Ethernet-to-USB adapter directly to a USB port on the blue machine (Fig. 6 , "Direct"). We next map the device to the red machine and export it to the blue machine through the Tunnel without the Gateway (i.e., the Tunnel connects directly to the blue machine); this arrangement demonstrates the latency cost of Cinch's use of virtualization (Fig. 6 , "Architecture"). Next, we add the Gateway to the above configuration, enabling all of Cinch's Policies ( §5), demonstrating the overhead when the Gateway interposes on all USB transfers (Fig. 6, "Cinch") . Finally, we place the security adapter ( §5.4) in between the Ethernet-over-USB device and the Gateway (Fig. 6 , "Cinch + TLS").
Each component of Cinch adds moderate delay, with the full setup (including the security adapter) resulting in a round-trip time of less than 2.5 ms. We believe that this delay is acceptable for latency-sensitive input devices; as a comparison, high-performance mechanical keyboards introduce delays on the order of 5 ms between successive keystrokes (for debouncing [78, 110] ).
What is Cinch's impact on throughput and other resources? We read 1 GB of data from a USB storage device to the blue machine and measure the throughput, memory consumption, and CPU load with and without Cinch; we repeat these experiments 20 times. Storage devices range in performance, so we experiment with two: a USB 2 flash drive and a USB 3 SSD. Figure 7 tabulates the results. For the flash drive, Cinch achieves 0.8× the baseline's throughput. There are two main reasons for this: (1) Cinch copies USB packets at several stages in its architecture; and (2) USB 2 flash drives use exclusively synchronous transfers, meaning that Cinch's added latency translates to lower throughput. For the USB 3 SSD, Cinch achieves 0.6× the baseline's throughput. Unlike in USB 2, USB 3 storage devices use asynchronous transfers and allow multiple in-flight requests. The primary overhead is thus memory copies.
With regard to CPU and memory use, Cinch has modest overhead. The memory Cinch consumes, which is primarily allocated to running the red machine, is in line with the cost of other security applications (e.g., antivirus).
Summary and critique
Our evaluation shows that Cinch can prevent previously documented vulnerabilities, fuzzing attempts, and crafted attacks against kernel vulnerabilities, even without attack-specific configuration. Augmented with a signature database, its success is even higher, though none of its Policies are well suited to defeating polymorphic attacks. In this respect, Cinch is comparable to related tools in network security: it rules out certain classes of vulnerabilities and can be adapted to address specific issues, but it is not perfect. Cinch's extensibility also seems reasonable, though our metrics here are subjective; and the performance impact, while not negligible, may be a good trade-off.
While this evaluation suggests that Cinch is a step in the right direction, it is far from definitive. First, we have likely not explored the full attack space, especially with regard to attacks on the non-USB portions of the kernel and on user software. Second, the red team comprised authors rather than disinterested parties, which may bias the security evaluation. Third, most systems are considered usuable by their implementers; a neutral, non-expert operator may have a very different perspective. Finally, Cinch's performance impact may be acceptable for a wide range of devices, but others (e.g., audio and video devices) have more stringent latency requirements that Cinch might not meet, especially when using the security adapter.
Related work
Cinch's contribution is architectural: most of its mechanisms are adapted from prior works and existing areas of research. Nevertheless, we are not aware of any other system that addresses the space of attacks described in Section 3.
USB security mechanisms (similar problem, different mechanisms). One can purchase an adapter that prevents data interchange on the USB bus, converting the bus into power lines only [57] . A software version of this protection is a set of Linux kernel patches known as grsecurity [23] , which essentially disable hotplug. This "air gap ethos"-provide defense by eliminating connectivityconflicts with Cinch's aim of controlled interaction.
Qubes [49] is a distribution of Linux that makes extensive use of virtualization to create isolated privilege domains for applications. For our context, Qubes places an entire USB bus in its own virtual machine; at this point, Qubes can export USB storage devices as block devices, but it does not by default support exporting keyboards [26] . Thus, keystrokes from a USB keyboard are delivered to the USB VM, and hence the user's applications would need to live on that VM, wherein the threats enumerated in Section 3 would be reprised.
The udev user space daemon on Linux [62] implements finer-grained policies than Qubes; for instance, the user can specify that some devices are allowed and others are not. However, udev can itself be attacked: udev requires the kernel to interact with every device that connects, so the device has an opportunity to attack the host machine before udev makes a policy decision. There are many commercial offerings that enable access control for USB devices [13, 15, 18, 22, 36, 38, 40, 54, 56, 61] ; the issues with these are similar to udev.
Finally, none of the preceding solutions rules out the semantic attacks of masquerading and snooping ( §3).
Device driver isolation and reliability (complementary problem, overlapping mechanisms). There is a vast literature on device driver containment and reliability. Below, we go over some of it, but we can only scratch the surface (a helpful survey appears in SUD [86] ).
We note at the outset that Cinch borrows mechanisms from many of these works: placing drivers in a separate virtual machine [97, 99, 115] , isolating a device with the IOMMU [108] , and leveraging hardware-assisted I/O virtualization [108, 115, 142] . However, the threat and the resulting architecture are different. In particular, device driver reliability work either assumes that the devices are correct or at worst buggy (not malicious). Thus, semantic attacks (masquerading, snooping, etc.) are out of scope; often, devices that deviate from specification ( §3) are, too. On the other hand, Cinch does not provide comprehensive protection against compromised drivers (though it can sanitize drivers' inputs, as outlined in §5.2). For this reason, the works covered below are complementary to-and in many cases composable with-Cinch.
Much work focuses on isolating faulty device drivers [86, 88, 97, 99, 100, 108, 114, 115, 126, [140] [141] [142] 146] . However, this work assumes that drivers are buggy (rather than malicious) and that the hardware is well-behaved. (SUD [86] assumes malicious drivers but requires that the hardware obey its specification.)
The Nexus OS [146] interposes between drivers and devices, to validate the commands passed to devices; this relates to Cinch's use of interposition to make devices comply with the USB spec ( §5). The distinction is that in Cinch, the guarantees are enforced against the device, versus against the driver. Other work, such as Termite, synthesizes drivers that are correct by construction [130, 131] but assumes that devices obey their specification.
Dingo seeks to eliminate device driver bugs, but buggy hardware is out of scope [129] . Carburizer [111] aims at tolerating hardware faults, but such faults are assumed to be non-malicious and are generally constrained: Carburizer targets circuit-level faults (e.g., flipped bits) rather than the types of attacks outlined in Section 3.
Secure peripheral interaction (different problem, overlapping mechanisms). SeRPEnT [145] and Bumpy [121] provide a safe pathway from input devices, through an untrusted host machine, to a trusted, remote machine. Like Cinch's security adapter, and its corresponding authentication and privacy applications ( §5.4), these systems add authentication and encryption capabilities to peripheral devices; but their setup and goals are different. Bumpy uses trusted hardware in the host machine to attest to user input relayed by the host's untrusted OS. SeRPEnT establishes an encrypted tunnel directly to a trusted remote machine, protecting against local tampering. Both of these are aimed at wide area networking. In contrast, Cinch delivers input through an untrusted bus to an endpoint on the host machine.
Wang et al. [143] modify the USB protocol to allow a host to authenticate to a peripheral (and, optionally, for the peripheral to authenticate to the host). The goal is to defend against masquerading threats ( §3. Cinch's security adapter ( §5.4) has a similar goal, but its mechanism does not require modification of the host's USB drivers.
Zhou et al. [147] allow trusted applications running on top of untrusted OSes to securely communicate with I/O devices. This is done via a trusted hypervisor that mediates access to hardware by both the trusted and untrusted components. Cinch also interacts with peripheral devices via an untrusted intermediary, but the architecture, mechanisms, goals, and threat model are all different.
Separation kernels and network security (related problems, related mechanisms). Two other research areas deserve special mention. The first is Rushby's separation kernel [127] , in which the operating system is architected to make a computer's components interact as if they were part of a distributed system (see [87] and [122] for modern implementations). The foundational observation of this work-that networks are a useful abstraction for interposition-is one that we share. However, our goals and scenario are different. The separation kernel was intended to be a small kernel, with compartmentalized units that could be formally verified, and it provided separation through information flow control. In contrast, our scenario is commodity operating systems, and we are seeking to apply the conceptual framework of network security. This brings us to network security itself. Cinch owes a substantial debt to this field, borrowing as it does concepts like firewalls, deep packet inspection, and virtual private networks. Moreover, the recent trend toward Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [119, 137] applies I/O virtualization (as do Cinch and some of the works cited earlier), but the point in NFV is to make middleboxes virtual, for reasons of configurability and cost.
Discussion
Cinch was motivated in large part by the observation that the situation with hardware security is recapitulating the history of network security. Originally, the Internet was a comparatively small number of mutually trusting organizations and users. As a consequence, there was relatively little focus on support for security within the network infrastructure. With the explosion of Internet users, spurred by changing economics, security suddenly became a serious problem. Similarly, commodity operating systems have relatively few safeguards against misbehaving hardware, reflecting a time when peripheral devices could be trusted. But, with the rapid decline in the barriers to producing plug and play peripherals, those days have come to an end-and Cinch aims to be useful in the world ahead.
Although Cinch's individual mechanisms have ample precedent in the literature, the architecture and the synthesis is novel (to the best of our knowledge). Moreover, as the evaluation results make clear, the implementation is pragmatic and surprisingly powerful. Looking at this fact, we feel comfortable stating that we have identified a good abstraction for the problem at hand.
To be clear, we are not saying that Cinch uniquely enables any one piece of its functionality ( §5); rather, the abstraction makes it natural to develop and deploy what would require far more work under alternative solutions ( §8).
We are also not saying that Cinch is comprehensive. First, its authentication and privacy mechanisms require changes to the device ecosystem: certificates for authentication, and modifications to hardware. However, these certificates are compatible with the chain of trust inherent in purchasing hardware (and trust could be bootstrapped by polling the user, in analogy with the permissions model on mobile devices), and the modifications are not onerous, as our implementation ( §6) indicates. Second, its sanitization mechanism is not formally verified and may benefit from further enhancement. Last, a comprehensive solution would also include work on driver reliability and protection ( §8), but Cinch could be composed with a number of these solutions.
Despite these issues, Cinch does appear to be a substantial improvement over the status quo. Of course, it is possible that, if Cinch were widely deployed, it would only escalate an arms race, and drive attackers to find ever more esoteric vulnerabilities. On the other hand, security is always about building higher fences, and the considerations at the heart of our work could guide the future design of peripheral buses and drivers.
